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Abstract
This study contributes to the valuation of employee stock options (ESO) in two
ways: First, a new pricing model is presented, admitting a major part of calculations
to be solved in closed form. It incorporates a vesting period and independent,
forced terminations of the contract. Designed with a focus on good replication of
empirics, the model ﬁts with given exercise characteristics better than earlier models.
In particular, it is able to account for the correlation of the time of exercise and
the stock price performance at exercise, suspected of being crucial for the option
value. The impact of correlation is weak, however, whereas the average rate of
cancellations turns out to play a central role. The second contribution of this paper
is an examination to what extent the current accounting standard of ESO valuation
is subject to discretion and potential misspeciﬁcation. Given my model is true,
the standard is a good proxy. Yet, one important input for the standard valuation
process is often unobservable at least for outsiders. Using my model as an example
how the accountant’s belief on that input could interact with the truth, I show that
there is wide latitude in the determination of prices.
JEL classiﬁcation: G13; J33; M41; M52
Keywords: Employee stock options; Executive stock options; Barrier options;
Exercise Behavior; Fair value accounting
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Firms use employee stock options (ESO) in order to align the interests of employees to the
long-term interests of shareholders. The question of how good stock options perform in
this discipline is a true challenge for theorists. Ignoring one side of the coin — incentives,
the more diﬃcult side — I focus on the cost of ESO to shareholders. When shareholders
grant ESO or similar incentive instruments to their employees, they want to know how
much they have to pay for incentive. The costs may become substantial in practice; for
instance, a sample of 239 German IPOs shows 43 ﬁrms with a ratio of outstanding ESO
to outstanding shares above 0.1.1
∗I would like to thank Jennifer Carpenter and Mark Vargus for the kind provision of data and useful
hints. I am indebted to Steven Huddart for a statistical analysis and to Mark Wahrenburg and Gunter
Löﬄer for useful discussions and comments. Seminar participants at Goethe University provided useful
comments.
1Private sample, unpublished.
1While the assumption that shareholders are unrestricted in trading stocks and treasury
notes seems reasonable, one cannot ignore that employees must neither sell their ESO nor
hedge them. It may be a consequence of these restrictions that most grantees exercise
their options considerably earlier than standard option pricing theory suggests (relying
on unrestricted option holders). Possibly, risk-averse option holders decide to forego a
part of an option’s time value in favor of secure cash obtained by early exercise.
No matter what the reason is, all valuation models have to pay regard for early ex-
ercise either way. Literature presents two main types of models. Rational models try to
explain why an option holder might exercise options early. In contrast, heuristic models
just specify when they usually exercise. Formally, heuristic models specify the joint dis-
tribution of price process and time of exercise. When outsiders are interested only in the
cost of stock options, a heuristic model is suﬃcient. They need to know how likely what
cash ﬂows become due under which condition.
Since there are no market prices for ESO, some other observable characteristics of
the history of option exercises must be utilized to see how good they correspond to their
model counterparts. Rational models may give a deeper insight than heuristic ones. The
latter, in contrast, can be designed easier to ﬁt well with real exercise patterns while
keeping things reasonably simple. Setting up a heuristic pricing model boils down to the
following:
• Choose some characteristics of exercise behavior (like the mean time of exercise),
serving as empirical benchmarks for the ﬁto fam o d e l .
• Estimate the characteristics.
• Model the exercise behavior.
• Fit the model under the physical probability measure.
• Compute prices under a corresponding risk-neutral measure.
The contribution of this paper is twofold: First, a heuristic pricing model for plain call
options with a vesting period is presented. The simple structure allows to solve essential
parts of the formula in closed form. The model adapts to a set of empirical characteristics
of exercise better than other models known from the literature. Conform to the results of
Carpenter [3], the average rate of option cancellations (one of the characteristics) has by
far the strongest price impact. Second, I use the model to get a picture to what extent
the current standard of ESO valuation, SFAS 123, is subject to discretion and potential
misspeciﬁcation.
1.1 Previous Research
Let me begin with explaining some terms. By termination I mean the end of the option
contract by any reason. Exercise denotes the end of a contract with a payoﬀ greater than
zero, while cancellation is a termination with zero payoﬀ, with no regard to the reasons. I
use forfeiture as a synonym for cancellation. Premature m e a n s” n o ta te x p i r y ” ,n om a t t e r
what is optimal.
Obviously, the value of an ESO grant shrinks if some option holders forfeit them,
possibly since they leave the ﬁrm before vesting or while the option is out of the money.
The value also declines when they exercise options at share prices diﬀerent from the op-
timal killing price.2 The current standard method for ESO valuation, SFAS 123, reﬂects
2Confer Barone-Adesi and Whaley [2].
2non-optimal exercise as follows: The dividend-adjusted Black/Scholes option price is cal-
culated with a maturity equal to the expected lifetime of the option, given it vests. In
order to correct for the forfeiture of options, the result is multiplied by the probability of
the option being vested.
By these adjustments, the SFAS method picks a certain exercise strategy with some
arbitrariness: Ignoring the (weak) concavity of the Black/Scholes price in time, the SFAS
price is correct3 if options terminate at some independent random time — in the money
or not, vested or not. The distribution of the termination time has to produce only the
given probability of termination before vesting and the appropriate expected value under
vesting. On the one hand, independency is rather implausible for a number of reasons, as
Rubinstein [20] argues. On the other hand, the relation between price path and exercise
decision can have a large impact on the value of options. For illustration, compare a
world of option holders deciding on exercise at pure random (roughly conforming to SFAS)
with a world of utility-maximizing risk-neutral option holders, to be completely free in
their decision. Given there are no forfeits before vesting and given some representative
stock-related parameters4, a risk-neutral holder would exercise a ten-year ESO — at the
killing price, like standard theory predicts — on average after 7.5 years. Given further,
the independent termination time in the SFAS world ended up at the same average, the
corresponding price would be 13% below. Evidently, a world of risk-neutral, unbiased
option holders is far from reality. But at the level of information demanded by SFAS 123,
this world is not less arbitrary than that of independency.
Several authors have modeled the rationales behind the crucial relation between exer-
cise decision and stock price path, as I call it, by a rational behavior of restricted option
holders and some sort of ”game” they are exposed to. For instance, Kulatilaka and Marcus
[16], Huddart [9], Rubinstein [20], or Hall and Murphy [7] assume that a representative
risk-averse option holder decides between holding the option or exercising it and investing
the proceeds in the riskless asset.
Of course, rational models are indispensable when incentives to employees are exam-
ined. Yet, the less-demanding heuristic approach is justiﬁable for the sole purpose of
valuation, too: Not explaining the exercise behavior thoroughly, instead supposing some
probability law of exercise that accounts well for empirical observations. The SFAS 123
method obviously follows this ”reduced-form” approach. Jennergren and Näslund ([11]
and [12]) incorporate early exercise by introducing an external, independent stopping time
as a proxy for option holders resigning or getting ﬁred. If stopped, the option is liquidated
at its current intrinsic value. If not, the option considered in [12] pays oﬀ only at expiry
(like a European option), which allows for a nearly closed pricing formula. The model is
therefore an example for the concept of independent termination, to be close to the SFAS
methodology as discussed above. The American counterpart is considered by the same
authors in [11]: Given the option is not stopped, the risk-neutral holder can freely decide
on exercise. The barrier model presented in this paper adopts independent stopping from
Jennergren and Näslund, yet the part of ”free” decisions diﬀers from that model.
Rubinstein [20] notes that it is diﬃcult to estimate relevant input factors reliably. His
estimate of the option value gives a rather radical lower bound but is based on few (and
reliable) factors. Such simple estimates are easier to be compared between diﬀerent ﬁrms.
Carpenter [3] compares the heuristic model of Jennergren and Näslund [11], called
extended American model, with a three-parameter rational model. In a ﬁrst step, both of
3Under some assumptions on the remaining risk of imperfect hedges; cf. sect. 2.3.
4See sect. 3.1.
3the models are calibrated in order to reproduce a number of statistical values on exercise
patterns. Information on stock price paths and option exercises is obtained from a sample
of ESO grants in 40 ﬁrms. The following benchmarks are used for the goodness of ﬁt:
1. the mean lifetime of an option (given exercise); 2. the normalized mean stock price
at exercise; 3. the mean cancellation rate as an average over the time from grant to
maturity. The cancellation rate thus is a mix of forfeitures before vesting, after vesting
and expirations out of the money. Several parameters form a set of conditions under
which the exercise characteristics should be reproduced by the model: the length of
vesting period, the mean stock return under the real-world probability measure, volatility,
dividend rate and the normalized mean stock price at expiry5. In a second step, the best-
ﬁtting parametrizations of the models are used to forecast the exercise characteristics
on behalf of each ﬁrm’s speciﬁc stock price parameters. In either step of investigation
the extended American model appears to perform as well as the dynamic one. The
extended American model gives prices strikingly similar to that of the SFAS approach,
thus supporting the appropriateness of the SFAS statement 123.
1.2 Adapting for Correlation
At this point I pick up the thread. Although the characteristics of exercise considered by
Carpenter [3] are certainly relevant, the correlation between exercise time and stock price
performance at exercise is well worth a look.
Suppose for the moment that all ESO holders behave like unrestricted rational in-
vestors. They decide to exercise the options if the stock price hits the downward-sloping
curve of killing prices, which is well-known from the theory of American options. Given
a sample of exercise events for a dividend-paying stock, time and stock price of exercise
will be in a strictly negative relation. For example, in the representative setting from
Carpenter [3] a correlation of −0.86 is obtained.6 In the rational model of Hall and Mur-
phy [7], risk-averse employees exercise options along downward-sloping lines of prices, too.
Real-world samples of exercise, however, show a positive correlation. In the Carpenter
dataset, it amounts to 0.14, while S. Huddart reports a correlation of about 0.2 for a
sample of over 50,000 ESO holders from seven companies.7 It seems that the time/price
pairs at exercise form a ”cloud” of a very diﬀerent shape, signalling ineﬃciency from the
viewpoint of an unrestricted rational investor. A switch from negative to positive cor-
relation, leaving other characteristics constant, should reduce the option’s value since a
higher level of late payoﬀs (at high discounts) will not oﬀset the shrinkage of early payoﬀs
(at low discounts). Since ESO runtimes are quite long, the change of discount factors
could be signiﬁcant.
Correlation may also play a role in the following problem: Recall that, instead of
maturity, the SFAS method enters the mean lifetime of an option (given it vests) into the
Black/Scholes formula. The time is estimated under real-world probabilities, but used to
compute a risk-neutral expectation. While a change of measure leaves an independent
stopping time unchanged, it will alter the distribution of times to be correlated with stock
price at exercise. Suppose that the correlation is strongly positive [negative]. The change
5I will argue in sect. 3.1 that a single point is not the best way to account for abnormal market returns.
6Parameters are quoted in sect. 3.1.
7Unpublished, private correspondence; for a description of the sample, see Huddart and Lang [10] or
Heath et al. [8]. Instead of time from grant to exercise, the time left to expiration was used, yielding a
correlation of −0.21. It is roughly, but not precisely the same as a constant minus exercise time since the
maturities vary.
4from the physical measure to the risk-neutral one will usually diminish the expected
performance at exercise. Given the correlation is about the same under both measures,
the expected time of exercise plausibly should decrease [increase] accordingly. In such
settings, the SFAS model uses an overestimated [underestimated] expected exercise time,
leading to higher [lower] prices.
In order to get a better ﬁt with empirics, I modify the model of Jennergren and Näslund
[11] as follows. Two independent events trigger an option exercise. First, and just like in
the earlier models, an independent random stopping event may enforce that the option is
paid oﬀ at the inner value — be it in the money or not. An unvested option pays zero in
case of being stopped. Second, an employee is supposed to exercise her (vested) options
if the stock price hits some deterministic, exponentially growing target. Formally, it is
nothing but the trigger of a barrier option, giving reason to call the whole setting a barrier
model. Its exercise-related parameters are the barrier’s height and growth rate plus the
constant intensity (hazard rate) of stopping.
Assuming a single barrier to be representative for all option holders seems merely
restrictive. One could instead imagine a portfolio of ESOs held by a group of employees
with diﬀerent barriers. Yet, I stick to a single barrier since numerical examples show that
it is almost negligible whether the barrier is diversiﬁed or not. The simple structure of
exercise decisions allows to solve parts of the formula analytically. A double integral is
left, to be treated with standard numerical methods.
For comparison, I will refer to Carpenter’s empirical values from [3]. Compared with
the extended American model, the barrier model suits better not only to the three char-
acteristics used there, but allows to adapt for the correlation between exercise time and
stock price at exercise as well. Since the extended American model cannot produce a
positive correlation, it only makes sense to compare prices when correlation is ignored
through adapting. If so, the characteristics from [3] yield a barrier model price, which is
9% below that of the extended American model.
I argued why correlation could aﬀect the value of an ESO. Correlation, however, is just
one determinant of the model among four. I cannot calibrate any of the characteristics
leaving the others untouched, since there are only three model parameters. In order
to ﬁnd out what characteristic should be measured with particular diligence, I vary each
characteristic by a small proportion of its standard deviation, seeing how much the newly-
adapted price has changed. In this sense, the average cancellation rate is by far the most
important parameter, followed by the mean stock price at exercise, and the exercise time.
The correlation has the weakest impact, though strong enough that it should not be
ignored.
Calibrating the barrier model with the empirical characteristics yields a mean stopping
rate of about 9%. It is, in contrast, impossible to get a good ﬁt without independent
stopping. In other words, a pure strategy of exercising at an exponential barrier is unable
to explain the exercise pattern well. It conforms to Carpenter’s result that idiosyncratic
stopping events play an important role. Furthermore, possibly one half or more of the
stopping events seem not to be caused by a ﬂu c t u a t i o no fs t a ﬀ: Boldly inferring from top
executives to all ESO grantees, about 3% of option holders leave their company through
one year by reasons that are expected to trigger an immediate option exercise.8
8Some empirical evidence on management turnover is collected in the appendix, sect. 5.6.
51.3 Discretion in Implementing SFAS 123
With this paper, I seek to provide a valuation model which is not too complicated but
ﬂexible. In addition, I use the model to investigate how prices according to the SFAS
method could relate to a true value. Encouraged by the ﬂexibility of the barrier model,
I venture to take it for the truth, looking at the ”errors” of the SFAS 123 prices with
regard to the prices of the ”true” barrier model.
The valuation method of SFAS 123 integrates, besides market-based parameters, two
characteristics of exercise: the probability that an option vests, and the mean lifetime
of an option under condition that it vests. Given a parameter set for the barrier model,
I compute the implicit SFAS input parameters and compare the SFAS price with the
”true” one. For a wide range of barrier model parameters, the error is rather small.
The strong link relies, however, on the assumption that the probability of vesting can be
measured properly, which is doubtful. The typical outsider, who must rest on standard
ﬁlings, cannot separate whether an option was cancelled before or after vesting or simply
because the option expired out of the money. From public data, cancellations are usually
determined by comparing an executive’s option holdings with the number of exercised
options. Since only the aggregated number of holdings is reported, cancellations usually
cannot be addressed to grants. The best of what can be estimated on a reliable basis is an
average of the mean cancellation rate over the whole lifetime of an option.9 The option’s
mean lifetime — the second input of the SFAS method — is often unobservable either.
An accountant having only the average cancellation rate at disposal, asked to value
an ESO after SFAS 123, has to split up the overall probability of cancellation into parts
before vesting, after vesting, and at expiration — by any assumption. Since there is no
explicit rule how to estimate the probability of vesting, every model could be accepted
that connects a given cancellation rate with some probability of vesting either way.
I use the barrier model as an example how the connection between cancellation rate
and probability of vesting could be established. Assuming that some cancellation rate and
mean exercise time have been observed, I select all model parameter triplets as candidates
for the connecting model if only they produce the correct cancellation rate. Similar,
models delivering the right cancellation rate and mean exercise time are identiﬁed to be
candidates for the ”truth” of exercise behavior. The ”truth” and ”the accountant’s belief”
do not need to coincide, resulting in proportional price discrepancies between −22% and
+10%.
Although I think that the barrier model provides a better picture of the truth, the
advantage of simplicity of the SFAS method is not to be neglected. Under the barrier
model, the SFAS 123 method could be regarded as a reliable proxy if the inputs were
deﬁned with more precision. The lack of specifying how the probability of vesting should
be estimated is a loophole, which can be closed at low eﬀort. The simplest way would be
to specify how the probability of vesting should be gained from other ﬁgures.
9See Carpenter [3, section 5]
.
62 The Barrier Model
2.1 Assumptions
Suppose the share price S follows the stochastic diﬀerential equation
dSt = Stµdt+ StσdW t (1)
with a standard Brownian motion on a complete probability space [Ω,F,P]. Let µ and σ
be constant. The stock pays dividends at a constant rate of δ. These values are assumed
not to be under control of the option holder through the lifetime of an option. The money
market account pays out a constant yield rate r. Shareholders, who authorize ESO grants,
are assumed to be unrestricted both in holding stock and investing in the money market
account. Moreover, they can trade continuously.
The employee holds a plain, not dividend-protected10 call on S with strike price K,
starting at time 0 and expiring in T. It is not exercisable until V , 0 ≤ V ≤ T,a n d
fully vested afterwards. Other exercise constraints like time windows around earnings
announcements are neglected. Although they are common practise, none of the models
considered here account for features like time windows either, and a comparison will not
be biased strongly. Equation (1) excludes that any dilution of the share price takes place
through the lifetime of the option. It is presumed that the price has been adjusted for
the option grant before it starts.
The case of independent stopping is excluded at the moment and considered in section
2.3. I specify the exercise behavior as follows: Every option holder is supposed to have
chosen some target of stock price performance in advance. If the target is hit, she exercises
all options at once. The target is a function of type
b(t)=B exp{α(t − V )},V ≤ t ≤ T, (2)
with constants B>K , α ≥ 0. The option holder exercises all and immediately in t if
St ≥ b(t). I will refer to b as the barrier. Because the holder has to wait until vesting,
the option is exercised in V (and not before) if SV ≥ b(V ). Given the price has never hit
the barrier between V and T, the option matures like a European call.
In the sequel, I will consider one single barrier function. Such a single line is ﬂawed as
the joint distribution of exercise time and stock price is degenerate onto a zigzag line in
[0,T]×[0,∞), which seems unrealistic (see ﬁgure 1). I will attempt to replace the unique
barrier by a ”portfolio” of barriers in the appendix 5.5. However, the generalization is
skipped since the implications are negligible.
2.2 Pricing without Independent Stopping
It is convenient to cut the option payoﬀ into three options, each paying out only along
one part of the zigzag line in ﬁgure 1. Let be
τ
∗ := inf {s ≥ V : Ss ≥ b(s)} or τ
∗ := ∞ if never hit. (3)
Consider the following events:
V := {SV ≥ b(V )} (exercise at vesting)
B := {SV <b(V ),τ
∗ ≤ T} (barrier is hit)
E := {SV <b(V ),τ
∗ >T} (termination at expiry).
10Protection against dividends is desirable from a perspective on agency conﬂicts but rarely observed.
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Figure 1: Support of the joint distribution of exercise time and the price at exercise; the vertical
line on the left consists of exercises immediately after vesting; the ﬂat line growing from B at
time V until T represents hits of the barrier, leading to an option exercise; the vertical line on
the right are exercises in the money at expiry.
Then the random option lifetime τ of the option can be written as
τ =



V : V
τ∗ : B
T : E
The random value τ is, the same as τ∗, a stopping time of the augmented ﬁltration
FS :=
¡
FS
t
¢
t≥0 generated by S.11 It meets the prerequisites for the deﬁnition of American
contingent claims in the sense of Musiela and Rutkowski [18, chapter 8.1]. Such contingent
claims can be priced in the absence of arbitrage as the expectation of the discounted payoﬀ
under the unique equivalent martingale measure Q.
Given the call option is terminated at τ, the option payoﬀ equals π(τ): =[ Sτ − K]
+.
Its value in t =0is denoted by P and fulﬁls
P = EQe
−rτπ (τ)=EQe
−rτ [Sτ − K]
+
Here, Q is the P-equivalent measure under which lnS is an arithmetic Brownian motion
with volatility σ and constant drift r − δ − σ2/2. Now I consider parts of the contingent
claim paying only in the events V, B and E:
π1 (τ):= [ Sτ − K]
+IV =[ SV − K]
+ IV (exercise at vesting)
π2 (τ):= [ Sτ − K]
+IB =[ b(τ
∗) − K]
+IB (barrier is hit)
π3 (τ):= [ Sτ − K]
+IE =[ ST − K]
+IE (exercise at expiry) (4)
Clearly, {V,B,E} is a disjoint decomposition of the sure event, implying π (τ)=π1 (τ)+
π2 (τ)+π3 (τ). When the prices P1, P2,a n dP3 of π1 (τ), π2 (τ),a n dπ3 (τ) (i.e., the
corresponding expectations) are determined, the option price is found as their sum. The
expectations are evaluated by diﬀerent techniques: Part π1 (τ) is nothing but a European
11See Karatzas and Shreve [15, chapter 1.2.]
8call option maturing at V , with an additional hurdle at the height of B = b(V ).S u c h
options are well-known and solved straightforward. Part π2 (τ) is similar to a barrier
option but a little more complicated because the barrier implies exercises not before V .
It is possible to perform parts of the integration by conditioning on FS
V, leaving a one-
dimensional integral to be solved numerically. Part π3 (τ) seems, at ﬁrst glance, to be
a European call capped at b(T),t h eﬁnal value of the barrier. The law of ST under E,
however, is diﬀerent from that of paths simply running from time 0 to T since all paths
hitting the barrier are ﬁltered out in π3 (τ). A one-dimensional numerical integral is left
for P3, too. For a detailed analysis and pricing formulae for P1, P2,a n dP3,t h er e a d e ri s
referred to the appendix.
2.3 Independent Stopping
This step expands the model by external, or independent, events of termination of the
option. They are intended to subsume events like liquidity shocks of the option holder,
dismissal, sudden disability, and things like that. Following Jennergren and Näslund [11],
there is a random time ϕ ≥ 0, to be independent of FS
T and exponentially distributed with
a constant intensity λ, called the stopping rate.T h ec a s eϕ ≤ τ means that an external
event enforces the ESO contract to be terminated and paid oﬀ at its intrinsic value, be it
zero or not. If the option’s life is stopped before vesting, the proceeds are zero. Formally,
Is e t
πstop (t): =
½
0: t<V
[St − K]
+ : else
,t ≤ T,
and deﬁne πstop (τ ∧ ϕ) to be the option payoﬀ with independent stopping. Note that,
by independence, a change of measure on FS
T has no inﬂuence on the distribution of ϕ.
As a preparation for the next, consider πstop (τ ∧ ϕ) under the measure P(·|ϕ).T h el a w
of S and τ is not aﬀected by this condition, which means that Q(·|ϕ) is the equivalent
martingale measure of P(·|ϕ). The payoﬀ πstop (τ ∧ ϕ) for ﬁxed ϕ i st h es a m ea st h e
non-stopped π(τ) from section 2.2 if the expiration term T was replaced by T∧ϕ.I no r d e r
to give emphasis to the impact of T on the payoﬀ π(τ) ,Iw r i t ei tπ(τ,T) henceforth,
and its price P (T) accordingly. It follows that under P(·|ϕ = t)
priceϕ=t (πstop (τ ∧ ϕ)) = EQe
−r(τ∧t)π (τ,T ∧ t)=P (T ∧ t) .( 5 )
Returning to the unconditional measure, the contingent claim πstop (τ ∧ ϕ) cannot be
hedged perfectly by holding shares and the riskless asset because τ ∧ϕ is obviously not a
stopping time of FS, which destroys the integral representability of πstop (τ ∧ ϕ). Clearly,
a sole arbitrage argument is unable to derive a unique price. I assume, as the preceding au-
thors, that there is no premium for the additional risk arising from independent stopping.
Section 5.4 in the appendix gives a formal justiﬁc a t i o nb a s e do nad i v e r s i ﬁcation argu-
ment. The contingent claim πstop (τ ∧ ϕ) is therefore priced just like a perfectly hedgeable
option at its expected present value. This immediately leads to the price formula. Let
λeλt be the density of ϕ.W i t hQ(ϕ ≥ T)=e−λT,Ig e tf r o m( 5 )
Pstop = EQpriceϕ (πstop (τ ∧ ϕ))
= EQe
−r(τ∧ϕ)π (τ,T ∧ ϕ)
= EQe
−rτπ (τ,T)I{ϕ≥T} + EQe
−r(τ∧ϕ)π (τ,ϕ)I{ϕ<T}
= e
−λTP (T)+
Z T
V
P (t)λe
λtdt (6)
9The integral must be computed numerically since P (t) is determined by numeric integra-
tion either. The calculations altogether lead to a two-dimensional integral, which needs
(potentially) much time to be computed. However, smooth integrands make the algorithm
converge fast12.
3 Comparison of the Models
3.1 Calibration
The question how an ESO pricing model should be calibrated is quite delicate since there
are no market prices available. Following the approach of [3] and previous authors, I try to
reconcile certain characteristics of the probability law of S, τ and ϕ with their empirical
counterparts. The choice of characteristics may have large impact on prices, but the
same is true for the probability measure that is chosen to compute the corresponding
characteristics in the model. It may be useful to take a conditional measure in order to
account for, say, an atypical market environment. Let M be that probability measure, the
speciﬁc shape of which I will discuss below. Consider the following model characteristics
of exercise:
• the mean lifetime of an option given that it is exercised, denoted after introduction
of κ := τ ∧ ϕ by
b κ := EM [κ|exercise at positive payoﬀ];
• the mean stock price at the time of exercise, normalized by the strike price — likewise
under condition of exercise, denoted by
c Sκ := EM [Sκ |exercise at positive payoﬀ];
• the average cancellation rate, i.e., the average over [0,T] of the expected rate of
forfeiture, given the option was not terminated before. Note that holders can forfeit
their options by stopping before vesting, by premature stopping of an underwater
option or by expiration out of the money. The cancellation rate is nothing but
a hazard rate, known from the credit risk literature or from reliability theory.13
Formally and in continuous time,
b c :=
Z T
0
M(κ ∈ dt, zero payoﬀ at t)
M(κ ≥ t)
.
• the correlation of exercise time and stock price at exercise, given exercise (at a
positive payoﬀ):
b ρ := corrM(·|exercise) (Sκ,κ)
The variables b κ, c Sκ, b c have already been suggested by Carpenter [3]. For reasons
explained in section 1.2, I add b ρ, which causes no additional eﬀort in the provision of
data. The corresponding empirical values will be labeled by a tilde: e κ etc.
12The routines are written in C++ code. They value an option within 2 seconds on a 400 MHz personal
computer.
13Confer Barlow and Proschan [1], for example.
10characteristics characteristics (average) standard
(ﬁrm-speciﬁc) value notation deviation
mean time of exercise 5.83 e κ 2.25
mean stock price perf. at exercise 2.75 f Sκ 1.42
mean cancellation rate 7.3% e c 7.1%
correlation of κ and Sκ 0.14 e ρ 0.1414
volatility σi 31% σ (10%)
proportional dividend rate δi 3% δ (2%)
vesting period Vi 1.96 V (1.03)
mean stock price perf. at expiry S10,i 327 S10 (225)
Table 1: Summary statistics on exercise of ESO and stock price related information from the
sample in Carpenter [3]; values in brackets are not referred to.
Carpenter [3] analyses a sample of ESO exercises from 40 ﬁrms, indicated here by i.
The above exercise/forfeiture characteristics plus ﬁrm-speciﬁc parameters like volatility
σi, dividend rate δi, mean length of the vesting period Vi and the mean stock price return
S10/S0 from grant to expiration of the ESO have been calculated as ﬁrm-wide averages
over grants. All contracts have been running over 10 years. The ﬁrm-speciﬁc averages of
every variable form the ﬁnal sample. For lack of own data, I will refer to this sample, parts
of which are at my disposal by courtesy of J. Carpenter. For comprehensive descriptive
statistics, see Carpenter [3, table 1]. The excerpt used here is found in table 3.1. I will
refer to these values as a benchmark throughout the empirical part of this paper, trying
to adapt the model to
³
e κ, f Sκ,e c,e ρ
´
=( 5 .83, 2.75, 0.073, 0.14).
The remaining input parameters are taken from the same source: the mean annual
stock return µ =1 5 .5 %, the riskless return rate r =7 %and a time to expiration of
T =1 0 .I ti sa s s u m e dt h a tS0 =1and that all ESO are granted at the money.
Since on the one hand every sample is at least biased by random and, on the other
hand, several of the observed values are correlated, it may be a good idea to account
for anomalies by an appropriate choice of M. The simplest approach is to ignore them,
taking averages just as they are. In other words, the characteristics are computed under
the physical measure M = P,a n dS10, the mean stock price performance at expiry, is
ignored. As a sophisticated alternative, one could condition every exercise decision on the
stock price path the option holder really witnessed. In this case, M should be close to the
measure that assigns probability N−1 to each of N observed paths and zero to the rest.15
This approach exploits a maximum of information (and needs high computational eﬀort)
and must be based on more detailed data.
Carpenter takes a way ”in between”: Her approach accounts for atypical stock returns
by setting M = P(·|S10). The physical measure is taken under the condition that every
path ends in the mean stock price performance at expiry, which is 3.27 here. It means that
all functionals are computed under some Brownian bridge.16 In my opinion, an adverse
eﬀect outweighs the advantages: Under the Brownian bridge, ending with a deterministic
positive return above K, not a single option expires out of the money. All probability of
14Obtained from a bootstrap algorithm.
15In a continuous-time model, M must be absolutely continuous with regard to P in order to enable
inference from the model onto the model characteristics. Since a normalized counting measure of a ﬁnite
number of paths is not integrable under the Wiener measure, an absolutely continuous measure ”close”
t ot h ec o u n t i n gm e a s u r ew o u l dh a v et ob eu s e d .
16See Karatzas and Shreve [15].
11cancellation must therefore go back to premature termination of underwater or unvested
options — in contrast to the sample, where 15 % of the ﬁrms have a negative mean return.17
The impact of underwater expiration is considerable. For example, I apply the extended
American Model from Carpenter [3, section 3.3] to the setting of table 3.1. Carpenter
reports that an annual stopping rate of λ =1 1%is necessary to produce a cancellation
rate of b c =7 %under the Brownian bridge. In contrast, when M = P,a ss p e c i ﬁed for
my model, setting λ =5 .6%leads to b c =7% . The stopping rates correspond to prices of
0.266418 (λ =1 1% )a n d0.3214 (λ =5 .6%), which is a diﬀerence of 21%.
Notation The vector
³
b κ,c Sκ,b c,b ρ
´
is denoted by b θ. Its corresponding empirical coun-
terpart is e θ. A subscript like b θ1101 indicates a sub-vector of b θ, with elements eliminated
that correspond to zero.
For lack of grant-speciﬁce x e r c i s ed a t aIw i l ls e tM = P, which means that the empirics
are compared to the characteristics under the physical measure. In order to obtain a good
ﬁt of statistical and model characteristics, I seek to minimize a quadratic distance. The
least value of
dist1111 := C1 (e κ − b κ)
2 + C2
³
f Sκ − c Sκ
´2
+ C3 ( e c − b c)
2 + C4 (e ρ −b ρ)
2 , (7)
dist1110 := C1 (e κ − b κ)
2 + C2
³
f Sκ − c Sκ
´2
+ C3 ( e c − b c)
2 ,
dist1101 := C1 (e κ − b κ)
2 + C2
³
f Sκ − c Sκ
´2
+ C4 (e ρ −b ρ)
2 ,
is searched by varying B, α and λ.T h e c o e ﬃcients C1 to C4 are set equal to one over
the empirical variance of the underlying characteristic. Doing so, I assign equal ”impor-
tance” to each of them. When only a subset of characteristics like e θ1101 is considered, the
corresponding coeﬃcient switches to zero.
3.2 Results
I compare the prices of the extended American model and the barrier model under diﬀerent
speciﬁcations. One aspect of speciﬁcation are the characteristics to be relevant for a good
ﬁt, i.e., the distance. Three types of distance are investigated: the full term (dist1111),
without correlation (dist1110), and without the cancellation rate (dist1101). The other
aspect of speciﬁcation refers to the freedom of choice for the model parameters B, α and
λ. The parameters B and α are always free to be optimized. The cancellation rate is
either ﬁxed at zero (attempt 1), at 3% (attempt 2), or free for optimization like B and α
(attempt 3). On behalf of attempt 1, I check whether independent stopping is essential
for a good ﬁt. Attempt 2 was motivated by a practitioner’s rule-of-thumb, claiming that
high-level employees ﬂuctuate at a mean rate of 3%.19 The stopping rate in the extended
American model, as the only parameter, is clearly free for optimization.
Comparing the model prices with those of the SFAS method is one objective of this
paper but not easily achieved since the inputs of the SFAS method are only loosely
connected with b θ, as described in section 1.3. A unique SFAS price cannot therefore be
derived from a given e θ.I n s t e a d ,Ic o m p u t eS F A Sp r i c e sas if the model was true:G i v e n
17Note that 15% here is the proportion of ﬁrms with paths expiring underwater on average. I expect
t h ep r o p o r t i o nt ob ee v e nh i g h e ri nad i s a g g r e g a t e ds a m p l eo foption grants.
18Despite thorough tests, I cannot resolve a contradiction between a price of 26.6 from my own com-
putations and that of 29 reported by Carpenter [3].
19See appendix, sect. 5.6 for some empirical support based on the turnover of top executives.
12values for B, α and λ, the SFAS inputs relevant for exercise behavior are derived from
t h eb a r r i e rm o d e l .T h es a m ep r o c e d u r ei sr e p e a t e df o rt h ee x t e n d e dA m e r i c a nm o d e l .
Following Carpenter, I interpret the ”expected option life” as the expected time until
termination (including cancellation) given that it vests, i.e. EP [κ|κ ≥ V ].I t s v a l u e
is computed under the barrier model and inserted into the Black/Scholes formula as
maturity. The Black/Scholes price is multiplied then by the probability of survival over
the vesting period, which equals e−λV here. The expected option lifetime is usually larger
than b κ; as a proxy, it exceeds b κ by up to 25%. The ratio depends mainly on the starting
point B of the barrier — the lower B, ceteris paribus, the more the expected option lifetime
exceeds b κ.
Table 3.2 presents prices for diﬀerent types of distance and diﬀerent speciﬁcations of
λ. Every block of rows summarizes models that are ﬁtted for a common type of diﬀerence
but with a varying parametrization of λ. P is the model price, whereas PSFAS denotes
the corresponding price after SFAS 123, given the model is true. Confer also ﬁgure 2, a
summary of the model prices.
First, I look how good the models ﬁt. The extended American model seems to pro-
duce only negative correlations20.W h e n dist1111 or dist1101 are applied, both including
correlation, the positive target value e ρ =0 .14 forces the extended American model to
make unrealistic "compromises" in other characteristics, which results in extreme prices.
Correlation should therefore not be a criterion for ﬁt of the extended American model.
Under dist1110, the only type that admits a ”fair” comparison by neglecting b ρ,t h eo p t i m a l
stopping rate λ =8 .1%is signiﬁcantly lower than that of 11% reported by Carpenter. I
attribute the diﬀerence to the choice of M: depending on whether P is conditioned on
the stock price at expiration or not (confer section 3.1).
Next, I check whether the concept of a barrier option alone is ﬂexible enough to
achieve a good ﬁt, or, in other words, whether independent stopping is negligible. If λ is
ﬁxed at 0, the distance is the worst among all speciﬁcations of the barrier model. The
outcomes of correlation are good, whereas a cancellation rate of b c ≈ 4%(now caused only
by underwater expirations) is much too low. The prices under condition λ =0are the
highest of all, coming close to the standard optimal American call price21, which amounts
to 0.392.
The barrier model is now adapted ”freely”, i.e. B, α and λ are subject to optimiza-
tion. The barrier model ﬁts best with the observed characteristics under all distances.
B e c a u s et h e r ea r em o r ef r e ep a r a m e t e r s ,ab e t t e rﬁt is no big surprise. Less obviously, and
remarkably, even under dist1110, when correlation is cut out, the barrier model produces
a positive correlation of 30.2%. I judge the right sign of a ”spontaneous” correlation —
with due care — as a signal that some aspects of real-world exercise behavior are captured
well by the barrier model.
The parametrization with a ﬁxed λ =3%gives a ﬁt in between. It provides no further
insight except that it probably would be a doubtful practise to estimate the stopping rate
by ﬂuctuation rates. The calibrated stopping rates of the barrier model, λ =9 .8%
(dist1111)o rλ =9 .6%(dist1110), are similar to that of the extended American model. Its
high value — compared with typical rates of staﬀ ﬂuctuation22 —c o n ﬁrms the conjecture
from the bad ﬁt of the setting with λ =0 : Some kind of externally driven terminations
seem to play an important part in exercise patterns.
The prices of the barrier model (see also ﬁgure 2) suggest robustness regarding the
20Unproved; it was checked for λ ∈ [0,20%], everything else kept constant.
21reﬂecting the vesting period
22See appendix, sect. 5.6.
13model + type of ﬁtted parameters prices characteristics distance
parametrization distance
B α λ P PSFAS b κ c Sκ b c b ρ distiiii
barrier mod., λ =0 1111 1.77 16.1% .3687 .3338 5.91 2.37 3.9% 13.8% .305
barrier mod., λ =0 .03 1111 1.87 16.8% .3379 .3114 5.94 2.42 5.2% 13.9% .148
barrier mod., λ free 1111 2.29 16.6% 9.8% .2748 .2654 6.05 2.52 7.5% 14.1% .037
extended Amer. mod. 1111 19.9% .1960 .1920 4.92 2.24 13.7% −4.9% .928
barrier mod., λ =0 1110 3.67 −12.2% .3828 .3362 6.10 2.35 6.8% −98.2% .100
barrier mod., λ =0 .03 1110 3.53 −8.5% .3491 .3137 6.11 2.41 7.3% −73.0% .074
barrier mod., λ free 1110 1.63 66.1% 9.6% .2682 .2647 5.92 2.64 7.3% 30.2% .008
extended Amer. mod. 1110 8.1% .2944 .2784 6.23 2.53 8.2% −29.8% .072
barrier mod., λ =0 1101 1.79 17.2% .3705 .3364 6.10 2.43 3.8% 14.1% .065
barrier mod., λ =0 .03 1101 1.90 17.4% .3388 .3131 6.08 2.46 5.1% 14.1% .053
barrier mod., λ free 1101 4.89 0.0% 16.7% .2168 .2202 5.93 2.59 10.3% 14.1% .015
extended Amer. mod. 1101 20.0% .1952 .1912 4.91 2.24 13.8% −4.8% 2.102
empirical target of optimization 5.83 2.75 7.3% 14%
particular target for comparison with ext. American model (dist1110) −29.8%
barrier mod., λ free 1111 290 0.9% 6.7% .3084 .2865 6.08 2.45 7.5% -29.7% .058
Table 2: The extended American Model and three parametrizations of the barrier model. Either model is calibrated in order to ﬁtb e s t
with given observable characteristics of exercise: b κ, the mean time of exercise; c Sκ, the mean stock price performance at exercise; b c,t h e
mean cancellation rate; b ρ, the correlation between exercise time and performance at exercise. The empirical target characteristics are found
in row 3 from below; the corresponding model values above.
Each block of rows summarizes models optimized under one type of distance between empirics and model. ”1111” includes the ﬁto fc Sκ, c Sκ,
b c,a n db ρ. ”1110” ignores b ρ, and ”1101” ignores b c. In the barrier model under ”λ =0 ”a n d” λ =0 .03”, only the level of the barrier B = b(V )
and its growth rate α are subject to optimization, under ”free λ” the stopping rate is optimized as well. In the extended American Model, λ
is the only exercise-related parameter. The price P is computed under the model with the ﬁtted parameters, PSFAS is the price after SFAS
123, given the model is true: the European Black/Scholes price with a maturity set equal to the expected lifetime of the option, given it
vests (computed under the model), adjusted for the probability of cancellations before vesting (1 − exp{−λV }). The last column contains
the distance achieved by the model. In the setting "1101" a numerical condition λ ≤ 20% has become binding for the extended American
model. The last row shows the outcome of a ﬁt with the characteristics as above, except correlation, set equal to the model outcome of the
extended American model under dist1110.
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Figure 2: Prices of the extended American model and three parametrizations of the barrier
model. Each model is calibrated in order to ﬁt best with given observable characteristics of
exercise. Diﬀerent notions of distance between empirics form the x-axis. Here, ”1111” includes
the mean values of exercise time, stock price performance at exercise, cancellation rate, and the
correlation; ”1110” excludes correlation; ”1101” excludes the cancellation rate. Under ”λ =0 % ”
and ”λ =3 % ”, only level and growth rate of the barrier are subject to a minimization of distance,
whereas under ”free λ” the stopping rate is also adapted.
choice of distance as long as the cancellation rate is involved. The range of prices coming
from diﬀerent distances is below 3.8%for λ =0and λ =3% , and equals 2.5%for free
λ (without dist1101). The exceptional low price under dist1101 signals a lack of stability
when e c is ignored. Therefore, I will drop dist1101 in the further.
Under each distance, the barrier model yields a considerable decrease in prices through
an increase in λ (for more details, see section 3.2.2). The overall price level of the barrier
model for free λ is below that of the extended American model under dist1110,w h i c h
amounts to 0.2976. The prices deviate by −6.6% (dist1111)a n d−8.9% (dist1110). I
attribute the shrinkage of value to the ”ineﬃciency” coupled with positive correlation, as
mentioned in sect. 1.2. Let me illustrate the impact by a reference model with negative
correlation: The last row of table 3.2 shows a ﬁt of the barrier model with the original
empirical benchmarks for b κ, c Sκ,a n db c, but with e ρ = −29.8%,w h i c hi st h eo u t c o m eo fb ρ
for the extended American model under dist1110. The barrier model then yields a price of
0.3084, now even higher than that of the extended American model.23 Hence, the lower
correlation signiﬁcantly increases the price.
23At ﬁrst glance, an ”ineﬃcient” exercise strategy, like that of the barrier model, cannot give a higher
value than that of the optimal policy, to be applied in the extended American model. Note that, however,
λ is much lower in the barrier model’s parametrization since the barrier already shortens the average
option lifetime considerably. An equal λ in both models clearly leads to lower prices for the barrier
model.
153.2.1 SFAS Prices and Discretion
Figure 3 compares the model prices with their corresponding SFAS prices. The input
characteristics of exercise for SFAS 123 (the probability of vesting pvest,a n dt h em e a n
lifetime given vesting e κvest) are hard to be observed. Like Carpenter [3], I obtain the
inputs from the ﬁtted models, implicitly assuming the models were true. All SFAS prices
are below their model counterparts (with one exception in case ”free λ under dist1110”,
a non-robust case). While the discount is around 10% for λ =0 , it reduces to 3% for
the free λ,a n dt o5.6% for the extended American model. Above I suspected the real-
world mean exercise time of being too high to be a realistic (risk-neutral) maturity for the
Black/Scholes formula. An overstated time could lead to higher prices. Since I observe
lower SFAS prices in most cases, my conjecture is not conﬁrmed.
A more elaborate check compares barrier model prices and SFAS prices for parameters
on a grid G over the ranges B ∈ [1.1, 5.0], α ∈ [0.0, 0.4],a n dλ ∈ [0.0, 0.2]. It turns out
that the proportional ”error” lies between −10% and +3%.
It may be reasonable to tolerate an error of 10% (a hypothetical one, given the model
is true) in favor of keeping things simple. However, it is doubtful whether the SFAS
method could be fed with correct inputs — even if holders did behave in accordance with
the barrier model. People who must rely on public data cannot estimate the probability of
vesting pvest directly because they will not be able to separate cancellations before vesting
from those after. Some model or assumption is needed to infer pvest and e κvest from other
characteristics. Since there is no rule how the SFAS inputs should be obtained, there is
room for arbitrariness. To what extent could an accountant inﬂuence the SFAS price by
a deliberate design of the estimation method for the inputs? Computing the SFAS price
given the barrier model is true means that (by the barrier model’s ﬁtting) four exercise
ﬁgures are processed in order to get pvest and e κvest. To my knowledge, such a degree of
precision is not common.
I want to investigate the latitude left to the accountant by an example, assuming
that only a part of information is used in order to estimate the SFAS inputs. Suppose
option holders behave in accordance with a certain (unknown) parametrization of the
barrier model, leading to a publicly observable cancellation rate e c =0 .073 and a mean
time of exercise e κ =5 .83.24 The accountant now seeks to get her estimates of pvest
and e κvest in accordance with e c and e κ. The mean lifetime e κvest is set equal to e κ.T h e
a c c o u n t a n tf o r m s ,b a s e do nt h eo b s e r v a t i o no fe c, a ”belief” about the true exercise behavior
in the shape of some (possibly diﬀerent) parametrization of the barrier model. She picks
a barrier model that produces a correct e c =0 .073 ± 0.001,a n do b t a i n sf r o mi tt h e
implicit pvest =e x p{−λV }. Yet, the belief does not need to reproduce e κ likewise. This
way, I demand informativeness at a level of widely accepted ad-hoc statements like ”The
probability of cancellation is assumed to spread evenly over the options runtime” (leading
to pvest := (T − V )/T P(cancellation)) or ”...to be distributed with a constant hazard
rate” (leading to pvest := exp{−Ve c}).
With pvest and e κvest, the accountant is ready to calculate the SFAS price. Let both,
truth and the accountant’s belief, be points in the grid G introduced above. Since truth
and belief do not necessarily coincide, any possible true parametrization yielding e c ≈ 0.073
and e κ ≈ 5.83 may face some arbitrary belief yielding the correct e c as well. Given e c, e κ,
and the grid, the true model prices range from 0.275 to 0.326, whereas the SFAS prices
corresponding to the accountant’s belief take values in [0.253, 0.301].A s s u m i n g e v e r y
combination of truth and belief to be admissible yields proportional discrepancies between
24Selected from table 3.1.
16−22% and +10%. Since it is not clear whether all points in G are suﬃciently realistic,
a more restrictive scenario pairs the beliefs with the (only) truth of the parametrization
B =2 .29, α =1 6 .6%,a n dλ =9 .8%, which is the model’s free ﬁt under dist1111. Then,
mispricing lies between −8% and 9.5%. Note that the example is restricted to a universe
of barrier models, suggesting that the accountant is given a wider latitude in reality.
The degree of discretion seems to be serious, leading me to assert that some precision
should be added to the accounting standard. When pvest, the rate of options being vested,
is intransparent (a common situation, as I see it), a rule should specify how to estimate
pvest from the average cancellation rate e c — from a value that outsiders can verify. One
obvious way of implementation is a rule-of-thumb like ”Set pvest := exp{−e cV }”. Even if
such a rule is systematically biased, at least the comparative power of SFAS option values
should improve. Under the barrier model for instance, where λ>b c,t h er u l ew a se v e nn o t
so bad since it increases the SFAS price relative to the "precise" SFAS price, which uses
exp{−λV }. This way, the rule-of-thumb would compensate parts of the undervaluation
of the SFAS method.
Alternatively, the procedure chosen to link between e c and pvest could remain at dis-
cretion of the accountant, but in this case evidence should be demanded whether the
procedure conforms with characteristics beyond e c as well. In terms of the above example,
the accountant would be ordered to verify if her belief on the barrier model produces the
correct e κ. Yet, the valuation process became more complicated, giving away the main
advantage of the SFAS method — simplicity.
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Figure 3: Model prices vs prices according to SFAS 123 under the assumption the models were
true: The implicit probability of forfeiture before vesting and the mean stopping time, given
that the option vests, are used as an input for the SFAS price calculation.
3.2.2 Value Drivers
The price sensitivity to the model parameters is investigated graphically. I evaluate the
price as a function of B, λ and α, respectively, each for a representative number of pairs
of the remaining parameters.
The price depends nonlinearly on the height B of the barrier at time V (ﬁgure 4).
While the curves show strong and monotonous growth roughly up to B = 200, the price
17may even decrease beyond this value, though weakly — presumably, since an exponential
barrier may crudely substitute the optimal killing price of American options. The shape
of the curves does not alter substantially when λ and α are changed — only the absolute
height of curves is aﬀected. The sensitivity of the price to a change of λ, the continuous
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Figure 4: Prices of the barrier model as a function of B, the height of the barrier at time V ,
for selected pairs (α,λ) ∈ [0,0.4] × [0,0.1], where α is the growth rate of the barrier and λ is
the continuous stopping rate. The abscissa is logarithmic.
stopping rate, (ﬁgure 5) is strong, decreasing and very weakly concave for all pairs of the
remaining parameters.25 Furthermore, the steepness of the function roughly corresponds
to a linear function of the absolute level of prices at some ﬁxed λ. Compared to the other
parameters, α is a weak value driver. The sensitivity is still the strongest for low B (ﬁgure
6). To sum up, the price can be called a ”tame” function of the parameters (B,α,λ) since
it is smooth. The parameters λ and B are more important for the price than α.
Since four characteristics of exercise are taken into account under dist1111,w h e r e a s
only three parameters can be calibrated in order to ﬁt the model, I clearly cannot control
a single characteristic leaving the other ones unchanged. It is therefore not obvious how
a ﬁtted model (seen as a map e θ 7→ (B,α,λ) ) responds to changes in e θ. Ideally, the
question should be treated with the help of a representative sample of characteristics.
For lack of such data, I will present comparative statics. Taking as a reference point the
optimal parametrization from the setting with free λ under dist1111, the price change is
measured when each component of θ alters. The change of price is expressed in units of
every characteristic’s standard deviation σj from table 3.1 in order to see which factors
drive the option value ”in practise”. I move each characteristic j in steps of size 0.2σj
from −0.6σj to +0.6σj. The range is narrow. First, to avoid problems with nonlinearity;
25The relation admits quadratic interpolation. A parabola, pinned at the prices for λ ∈ {0; 5%; 10%},
yields proportional errors less than 10−3 within λ ∈ [0,10%]. The error is around 10−2 for linear
approximation.
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Figure 5: Prices of the barrier model as a function of the stopping rate λ for selected pairs
(B,α) ∈ [110,500] × [0,0.4]. B is the height of the barrier at time V , the growth rate of the
barrier is denoted by α.
second, because the characteristics of e θ will be correlated in practise26, whereas isolated
variations of characteristics could lead to unrealistic combinations if values from outer
quantiles of the marginal distributions occur.
The following table presents the sensitivity of the price to an increase of each e θj by
one standard deviation. For a detailed summary, see table 5.6 in the appendix.
characteristic e θj ∆ e θj (one stand. deviation) ∆P/P
mean time of exercise e κ 2.25 −6.6%
mean stock price perf. at exercise f Sκ 1.42 −14.6%
mean cancellation rate e c 7.1% −50.4%
correlation e ρ of κ and Sκ 0.14 −3.2%
The cancellation rate has by far the strongest impact, followed by the stock price
performance at exercise and exercise time. Note that the price decreases when the time
of exercise rises — as opposed to the Black/Scholes model used in SFAS 123. Deferring
the average time of exercise does not mean realizing a larger part of time value in general.
Here, the postponement of exercise is achieved by raising the barrier, accompanied by
more intensive independent stopping to keep f Sκ down. A portion of proﬁtable payoﬀsf r o m
stopping at the barrier is therefore replaced by payoﬀs at independent stops, containing
a considerable amount of options cancelled out of the money.
The inﬂuence of correlation is weak, it should be noticed yet that it is one objective
of this paper to clarify whether correlation is an important issue at all.T h e a n s w e r i s
that a model of similar ﬂexibility as the barrier model should not ignore correlation, while
a crude estimate of e ρ seems to be suﬃcient. Moreover, it is remarkable that f Sκ —n o t
relevant in SFAS 123 — has a price impact two times stronger than e κ, which is close to the
26See Carpenter [3, table 1].
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Figure 6: Prices of the barrier model as a function of the barrier’s growth rate α for selected
pairs (B,λ) ∈ [110,500]×[0,0.1]. B is the height of the barrier at time V , λ is the continuous
stopping rate. The lower B, the steeper the curves are.
second SFAS input e κvest, the mean lifetime given vesting. The signiﬁcance of f Sκ,h o w e v e r ,
might be weaker when the characteristics are computed under a measure M that accounts
for a bullish/bearish market (cf. sect. 3.1).
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper deals with the valuation of employee stock options from an external perspective
such as that of shareholders or analysts. Unlike shareholders who are assumed to be able
to freely take any position in shares or debt, option holders are not allowed to hedge
them. This leads to option exercise patterns deviating substantially from that of standard
theory. To account for this fact, I follow the approach of Carpenter [3]. Observing certain
characteristics of an exercise pattern, I specify a model’s parameters such that it best
reproduces the observations. The model incorporates vesting periods as well as forced
termination of the option. A grantee is supposed to exercise her option if the stock price
passes a deterministic threshold, which may grow exponentially. Another source of forced
terminations of the option life is some independent, exponentially distributed random
time. If stopped, the current intrinsic value is paid oﬀ. Parts of the calculation are solved
in closed form, leaving a smooth function to be integrated in two dimensions.
The model is speciﬁed by the intensity of independent stopping and height plus drift
of the barrier triggering exercise. It adapts better to a representative set of empirical
characteristics than the extended American model from Carpenter [3]. Clearly, the ad-
vantage of higher ﬂexibility involves the risk of lower robustness especially with regard to
the characteristics chosen as a criterion of the model’s ﬁt. It turns out that the model is
robust as long as the annual cancellation rate of options, one of the criteria, is included.
Hence, even if the barrier model is seen to be too complicated for external reporting, it
20appears to be applicable at least for internal purposes, for instance when members of a
compensation committee want to estimate the cost of an ESO program.
Besides practical application, a more theoretical contribution of this paper is the in-
vestigation of the inﬂuence of the correlation between exercise time and the stock price at
exercise. Correlation is interesting because it largely deviates in practise from theoretical
values. Since the model is able to incorporate correlation appropriately, it provides an
opportunity to study the impact of correlation, given the model was true. The eﬀect of
correlation exists, but it is weak. In general, the model prices are slightly lower than
those of the extended American model. Comparative statics show that the annual can-
cellation rate is the most important value driver, followed by the stock price performance
at exercise.
Since cancellations are such important for the option value, I use my model to investi-
gate how precisely the standard valuation approach accounts for options being canceled.
Suppose the barrier model were true and all inputs for the SFAS method were measured
reliably, the SFAS prices would be rather stable and slightly lower than barrier model
prices. There is no evidence for suspecting SFAS 123 to be an unreliable proxy — at such
a favorable level of data provision.
The SFAS approach uses the probability of forfeiture before vesting as an input,
whereas an aggregated cancellation rate over diﬀe r e n tg r a n t si so f t e nt h eo n l yr e l i a b l e
information about cancellations. Using the barrier model in a double role as the ”truth”
and ”the accountant’s belief” — utilized to estimate the SFAS input from the cancellation
rate — I observe a wide latitude of discretion.
5 Appendix
In order to value the option when independent stopping is excluded (λ =0 ), the payoﬀ
π (τ) is decomposed into π1 (τ): =[ Sτ − K]
+IV (exercise at vesting), π2 (τ): =[ Sτ − K]
+IB
(barrier is hit), and π3 (τ): =[ Sτ − K]
+ IE (exercise at expiry). Each payoﬀ is valued sep-
arately.
5.1 Part I: Immediately After Vesting — π1(τ)
This contingent claim is nothing but a European call with maturity V ,s t r i k eK,a n d
an additional exercise hurdle of height B. The hurdle option can be decomposed into a
European call with strike B and a digital option paying out B −K iﬀ SV ≥ B.B o t ha r e
well-known, and the price of π1 (τ) amounts to
P1 = e
−rVEQπ1 (τ)=e
−δVS0Φ(d1) − e
−rVKΦ(d2)
where Φ(·) denotes the standard normal distribution function and
d1,2 :=
ln(S0/B)+
¡
r − δ ± 1
2σ2¢
V
σ
√
V
5.2 Part II: Exercise at the Barrier — π2 (τ)
In a ﬁrst step, I condition the expected value on FS
V:
P2 = EQe
−rτπ2 (τ)=EQEQ
£
e
−rτ∗
(b(τ
∗) − K)IB
¯
¯F
S
V
¤
21The random time τ∗, restricted to B,i sσ (St,V ≤ t ≤ T)-measurable. It is therefore a
stopping time on B for the augmentation of the ﬁltration (σ (Ss,V ≤ s ≤ t))V ≤t≤T .S i n c e
the stock price path has the strong Markov property, I can replace the condition FS
V by
σ (SV):
P2 = EQEQ
£
e
−rτ∗
(b(τ
∗) − K)IB
¯
¯SV
¤
(8)
Consider now the inner conditional expectation at some ﬁxed SV. It turns out to be similar
to a special type of barrier option27. The distribution of τ∗ under Q(·|SV) is essential for
computation. Under Q(·|SV), the process Yt := ln(St/B), t ≥ V ,i saB r o w n i a nm o t i o n
with a constant drift r − δ − σ2/2 and a starting point −ln(B/SV). The condition
St ≥ b(t) of hitting the barrier from (3) can be rewritten with C := ln(B/SV) and the
Brownian motion Zt := Yt − α(t − V )+C to
Zt ≥ C (9)
Hence, τ∗ is the hitting time of Z for a constant barrier C,w h e r eZ starts at time V in 0,
running at a constant drift β := r−δ−α−σ2/2. The distribution of τ∗ has a well-known
density h∗, which amounts to28
h
∗ (t,C) dt := Q(τ
∗ ∈ dt|C)=
C
σ
√
2π (t − V )
3
2
exp
(
−
(C − β (t − V ))
2
2σ2 (t − V )
)
dt
I now return to the unconditional measure Q. Taking into account that
C ∼ N
³
ln(B/S0) − βV,σ
√
V
´
,
the density h of τ∗ under Q is now determined by integration over C:S e tq := ln(B/S0)−
αV .T h e n
h(t)=
1
σ
√
2πV
Z ∞
0
exp
(
−
(x − q)
2
2σ2V
)
h
∗ (t,x) dx .
After some lengthy substitutions, the density can be rewritten to
h(t)=( a(t)+d(t))exp{g (t)} (10)
where
ψ(t):=
q
σ
r
t − V
tV
,g (t): =−
(q − βt)
2
2tσ2
a(t):= Φ(ψ (t))
q
σ
√
2πt3 ,d (t): =
√
V
2πt
√
t − V
exp
½
−
ψ
2 (t)
2
¾
For further computation, I introduce
H (γ): =
Z T
V
exp{−γt}h(t) dt, γ ∈ R, (11)
which is applied when returning to the price of π2 (τ):
P2 = EQe
−rτ∗
(b(τ
∗) − K)IB =
Z T
V
e
−rt¡
Be
α(t−V ) − K
¢
h(t) dt
= Be
−αV H (r − α) − KH(r) .
27In the terminology of Rich [19], it is an up-and-out call with a rebate equal to the barrier minus
strike.
28See Rich [19].
22Computation The function H must be evaluated numerically. All parts of the inte-
grand are bounded, except d, which is unbounded at t ↓ V . The peak is eliminated by a
further substitution: h is split up by resolving the brace in (10) into a(t)exp{g (t)} and
d(t)exp{g (t)}.T h eﬁrst part is evaluated as before; for the second part I replace t by
s := (t − V )
1/2, arriving at
I (γ):=
Z T
V
exp{g (t) − γt}b(t) dt
=
Z √
T−V
0
2sexp
©
g
¡
s
2 + V
¢
− γ
¡
s
2 + V
¢ª
b
¡
s
2 + V
¢
ds
. . .
=
Z √
T−V
0
√
V
π(s2 + V )
exp
(
−
q2s2 +( q − (s2 + V ))
2
2σ2 (s2 + V )
− γ
¡
s
2 + V
¢
)
ds
which has a bounded and equicontinuous integrand that suits for numerical integration.
Now,
H (γ)=I (γ)+
Z T
V
exp{g (t) − γt}a(t) dt
w h i c hi su s e di n( 1 1 )a sb e f o r e .
5.3 Part III: Exercise at expiration — π3(τ)
The remaining term collects cases in which the barrier was not met before T.A t ﬁrst
glance, π3 (τ) seems equivalent to a European call capped at b(T). But this is not correct
since some of the paths of Z that would mature at a height within [K,b(T)] do not do so
because they hit b before. The distribution is biased downwards. It is more convenient
now to turn over from Z to a similar process Xt := ln(St/S0) − αt, t ∈ [0,T], which has
t h es a m ed r i f tβ as Z b u tas t a r t i n gp o i n tz e r o . D e ﬁne M := supV ≤t≤T Xt. Recalling
q =l n( b(0)/S0), the condition of not hitting the barrier changes to
Xt <q ,V ≤ t ≤ T, or, equivalently, M<q .
For the integral, the distribution of STIE or, similar, that of XTIE is needed. I condition
the probability on XV, which is equivalent to SV regarding the generated σ-algebras:
Q(M<q , X T ≤ z)=EQ Q[M<q , X T ≤ z|XV] .
Note that E implies SV <B ,w h i c hi sXV <q . A na p p l i c a t i o no ft h er e ﬂection prin-
ciple and Girsanov’s theorem (cf. Musiela and Rutkowski [18, sect. B3]) yields for the
conditional probability
Q[M<q , X T ≤ z|XV = x],x<q
= Q[M − x<q− x,XT − x ≤ z − x|XV = x],x<q
= Φ
µ
z − x − β (T − V )
σ
√
T − V
¶
− exp
½
2β (q − x)
σ2
¾
Φ
µ
z + x − 2q − β (T − V )
σ
√
T − V
¶
This has to be integrated over XV,w h e r eXV ∼ N
³
βV,σ
√
V
´
:
Q(M<q , X T ≤ z)
=
1
σ
√
2πV
Z q
−∞
Q[M<q , X T ≤ z|XV = x]exp
(
−
(x − βV)
2
2σ2V
)
dx. (12)
23For integration over the payoﬀ π3 (τ), the density l(z) of XT is needed. I obtain it by
diﬀerentiation of (12)
l(z) dz = Q(M<q , X T ∈ dz)=dz
d
dz
Q(M<q , X T ≤ z)
=
dz
σ
√
2πV
Z q
−∞
exp
(
−
(x − βV)
2
2σ2V
)
dx
σ
p
2π(T − V )
×
×
"
exp
(
−
(x + β (T − V ) − z)
2
2σ2 (T − V )
)
−
−exp
½
2β (q − x)
σ2
¾
exp
(
−
(z + x − 2q − β (T − V ))
2
2σ2 (T − V )
)#
. . .
=
·
f (z)Φ
µ
q − µ1
σ1
¶
− g (z)Φ
µ
q − µ2
σ1
¶¸
dz
where
µ1 :=
V
T
z, µ 2 :=
V
T
(2q − z) ,
U := T − V, σ 1 := σ
r
V
T
U,
f (z): =
1
σ
√
2πT
exp
½
1
2σ2U
µ
V
T
z
2 − (βU − z)
2 − Vβ
2U
¶¾
,
g (z): =
1
σ
√
2πT
exp
½
1
2σ2U
µ
V
T
(z − 2q)
2 − β
2VU+4 βqU − (z − 2q − βU)
2
¶¾
.
Finally, using ST = S0 exp{αT + XT}, the price P3 of the part ”exercise in T”a m o u n t s
to
P3 = EQe
−rT [ST − K]
+ IE
= e
−rTS0
Z q
ln(K/S0)−αT
µ
e
αTe
z −
K
S0
¶
l(z) dz
which can be solved numerically in a straightforward manner.
5.4 The Unhedgeable Risk of Independent Stopping
In this section I present a suﬃcient condition, under which my assumption of section 2.3
not to price the unhedgeable risk of independent stopping is justiﬁed. Suppose the ESO
i sn o tg r a n t e dt oas i n g l ep e r s o nb u tt oal a r g eg r o u po fN employees, holding the Nth
part each. By assumption, the risk of stopping is idiosyncratic to each of them. Formally,
there is a whole number of i.i.d. random times ϕi, the entirety of which being independent
of FS
T. This implies the identity of P and Q on σ (ϕi,i∈ N). By independence, holding
the portfolio of claims
Cportf :=
½
1
N
πstop (τ ∧ ϕi), due in τ ∧ ϕi
¯
¯
¯
¯ i =1 ,...,N
¾
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Figure 7: Joint distribution of exercise time and price at exercise if barriers are dispersed; the
vertical line on the left consists of exercises immediately after vesting; the line on the right of
exercises in the money at expiry; the area in between arises from exercises at various barriers,
growing at the same proportional rate and starting from a height between Bhigh and Blow,t o
be equally distributed.
is nearly the same for large N as holding a continuum of contingent claims
Ccont := {P(ϕ ∈ dt) πstop (τ ∧ t), due in τ ∧ t| t ∈ [V,T]}
which is easily proved by the Strong Law of Large Numbers.29 The price of Cportf then
almost equals that of Ccont, yielding with (5) and the independence of ϕ and FX
T
lim
N→∞
price(Cportf)=
Z ∞
0
price(πstop (τ ∧ t)) P(ϕ ∈ dt)=Ee
−r(τ∧ϕ)π(τ,T ∧ ϕ) , (13)
which is a generalization of (6). This result can be justiﬁed by CAPM-like arguments,
too.
5.5 Dispersion of the Barrier
In ﬁgure 1 it was seen that the joint distribution of τ and Sτ is degenerate to a zigzag line of
Lebesgue measure zero. While people exercise their options quite often immediately after
vesting or at expiry, leading to jumps in the marginal distribution of κ, a single barrier
for the time between vesting and expiry seems less plausible. Instead, I follow the idea of
a group of option holders, each choosing some individual barrier. For simplicity, only the
height B is subject to variation, while the proportional growth rate α remains constant
(confer ﬁgure 7). I consider a special setting: B is equally distributed on some interval
[Blow,B high] such that K<B low. By assumption, it is independent of all random variables
introduced so far. Let be ∆ := Bhigh −Blow and Bcenter := 1/2(Bhigh + Blow). The option
is priced as the average price over diﬀerent barrier functions by the same argument as in
section 5.4. Given that PB,α(T) denotes the price for an individual barrier, one obtains
Pdispersed = ∆
−1
Z Bhigh
Blow
PB,α(T) dx.
29Given prices are additive and ESOs are inﬁnitely divisible.
25Figure 8: Option prices as a function of the dispersion and the general level of the barrier.
Areas of equal lightness are areas of roughly the same price. Dispersion is measured by the
width ∆ of the barrier’s range [Blow,B high]. ”Barrier at vesting” denotes the midpoint Bcenter
of the interval. In the area ”artefacts”, the condition Blow >Kis hurt. Other parameters:
α =2 0 % , λ =3 %
Keeping Bcenter ﬁxed, I check how much Pdispersed is aﬀe c t e db ya ni n c r e a s eo f∆.T h e
impact is weak. For illustration, consider the option price as a function of ∆ and Bcenter
for α =2 0% , λ =3% . It is drawn in contour lines in ﬁgure 8. The ﬂat lines on the left
half of the ﬁeld show that the impact of ∆ is negligible at a range from 0 to about 50.
Note that the range refers to B = b(V ).W h e nα =2 0% , this means a range from 0 to
248 at expiry. Other characteristics show a low sensibility, too. An analysis for α =0%
or α =4 0%provides similar results. To sum up, a model with a dispersed barrier looks
more aesthetic but gives neither new insight nor essential price diﬀerences.
5.6 Some Evidence on Management Turnover
Hadlock and Lumer [6] report an annual rate of 3.8% for CEOs from a sample of 259 U.S.
ﬁrms. Kaplan [14] compares the CEO turnover in large U.S. and Japanese ﬁrms, resulting
in rates of 2.2% (Japan) and 2.9% (U.S.) when CEOs entering the supervisory board are
left out. I assume that they may continue to hold their options. Kang and Shivdasani [13]
ﬁnd 3.1% p.a. for Japanese ﬁrms when the turnover is corrected for executives remaining
on the board. The U.S. sample of Denis, Denis and Sarin [5] yields a weighted mean rate
of 7.5%, yet it is not corrected in the above sense. The same problem holds for the rate
of 9.2% from Mikkelson and Partch [17], where CEO turnover in unacquired U.S. ﬁrms is
measured over ten years. Dahya, McConnell and Travlos [4] report forced CEO turnover
at rates between 2.7% and 5% from a dataset of 470 industrial ﬁrms in the U.K.
26References
[1] Richard E. Barlow and Frank Proschan. Statistical Theory of Reliability and Life
Testing. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975.
[2] G. Barone-Adesi and R. E. Whaley. Eﬃcient analytic approximation of american
option values. Journal of Finance, 42:301—320, 1987.
[3] Jennifer N. Carpenter. The exercise and valuation of executive stock options. Journal
of Financial Economics, 48:127—158, 1998.
[4] Jay Dahya, John J. McConnell, and Nickolaos G. Travlos. The cadbury commit-
tee, corporate performance, and top management turnover. Journal of Finance,
57(1):461—483, 2002.
[5] David J. Denis, Diane K. Denis, and Atulya Sarin. Ownership structure and top
executive turnover. Journal of Financial Economics, 45:193—221, 1997.
[6] Charles J. Hadlock and Gerald B. Lumer. Compensation, turnover, and top man-
agement incentives: Historical evidence. Journal of Business, 70(2):153—186, 1997.
[7] Brian J. Hall and Kevin J. Murphy. Stock options for undiversied executives. Journal
of Accounting and Economics, 33:3—42, 2002.
[8] Chip Heath, Steven Huddart, and Mark Lang. Psychological factors and stock option
exercise. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(2):601—627, 1999.
[9] Steven Huddart. Employee stock options. Journal of Accounting and Economics,
18:207—231, 1994.
[10] Steven Huddart and Mark Lang. Employee stock option exercises. an empirical
analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 21:5—43, 1996.
[11] L. Peter Jennergren and Bertil Näslund. A comment on "valuation of executive stock
options and the FASB proposal". Accounting review, 68(1):179—183, 1993.
[12] L. Peter Jennergren and Bertil Näslund. A class of option with stochastic lives and
an extension of the black-scholes formula. European Journal of Operational Research,
91:229—234, 1995.
[13] Jun-Koo Kang and Anil Shivdasani. Firm performance, corporate governance, and
top executive turnover in japan. Journal of Financial Economics, 38(1):29—58, 1995.
[14] Steven N. Kaplan. Top executive rewards and ﬁrm performance: A comparison of
japan and the united states. Journal of Political Economy, 102(3):510—546, 1994.
[15] I. Karatzas and S. Shreve. Brownian Motion and Stochastic Calculus. Springer, 1988.
[16] Nalin Kulatilaka and Alan J. Marcus. Valuing employee stock options. Financial
Analyst Journal, 50:46—56, 1994.
[17] Wayne H. Mikkelson and M. Megan Partch. The decline of takeovers and disciplinary
managerial turnover. Journal of Financial Economics, 44:205—228, 1997.
27[18] Marek Musiela and Marek Rutkowski. Martingale Methods in Financial Modelling.
Springer, 1998.
[19] Don R. Rich. The mathematical foundations of barrier option-pricing theory. Ad-
vances in futures and options research, 7:267—311, 1994.
[20] M. Rubinstein. On the accounting valuation of employee stock options. Journal of
Derivatives, 3(1):8—24, 1995.
28target characteristics ﬁtted parameters prices achieved characteristics distance
e κ f Sκ e c e ρ B α λ P PSFAS b κ c Sκ b c b ρ dist1111
4.48 275 0.073 0.140 175 0.144 0.072 28.91 26.82 4.95 214 0.076 0.142 0.231
4.93 275 0.073 0.140 189 0.155 0.081 28.51 26.74 5.33 226 0.076 0.142 0.151
5.83 275 0.073 0.140 229 0.167 0.098 27.48 26.55 6.05 252 0.075 0.141 0.037
6.28 275 0.073 0.140 259 0.162 0.103 27.04 26.55 6.38 265 0.074 0.141 0.007
6.73 275 0.073 0.140 310 0.143 0.106 26.72 26.66 6.69 278 0.073 0.140 0.001
7.18 275 0.073 0.140 396 0.105 0.105 26.72 27.01 6.98 290 0.070 0.139 0.022
5.83 190 0.073 0.140 190 0.156 0.071 29.58 27.66 5.49 230 0.070 0.138 0.105
5.83 218 0.073 0.140 199 0.162 0.078 29.03 27.38 5.66 237 0.072 0.139 0.023
5.83 247 0.073 0.140 211 0.167 0.088 28.30 26.99 5.85 244 0.073 0.140 0.000
5.83 275 0.073 0.140 229 0.167 0.098 27.48 26.55 6.05 252 0.075 0.141 0.037
5.83 303 0.073 0.140 259 0.157 0.110 26.47 26.01 6.26 261 0.077 0.142 0.128
5.83 332 0.073 0.140 374 0.094 0.127 24.92 25.14 6.49 273 0.081 0.143 0.269
5.83 360 0.073 0.140 662 -0.014 0.128 24.76 25.27 6.68 283 0.080 0.142 0.451
5.83 275 0.030 0.140 174 0.176 -0.007 37.70 34.16 6.13 241 0.033 0.141 0.076
5.83 275 0.045 0.140 185 0.180 0.025 34.33 31.68 6.10 245 0.047 0.141 0.061
5.83 275 0.059 0.140 201 0.179 0.060 30.93 29.15 6.08 248 0.061 0.141 0.048
5.83 275 0.073 0.140 229 0.167 0.098 27.48 26.55 6.05 252 0.075 0.141 0.037
5.83 275 0.087 0.140 303 0.116 0.140 23.95 23.87 6.03 256 0.089 0.141 0.026
5.83 275 0.101 0.140 501 0.000 0.166 21.81 22.17 5.93 257 0.100 0.140 0.018
5.83 275 0.116 0.140 1816 -0.263 0.176 21.09 21.50 5.81 256 0.111 0.137 0.021
5.83 275 0.073 0.056 244 0.120 0.093 28.02 26.85 6.06 249 0.075 0.057 0.044
5.83 275 0.073 0.084 240 0.134 0.096 27.80 26.72 6.07 251 0.075 0.085 0.042
5.83 275 0.073 0.112 235 0.149 0.097 27.64 26.64 6.06 251 0.075 0.113 0.039
5.83 275 0.073 0.140 229 0.167 0.098 27.48 26.55 6.05 252 0.075 0.141 0.037
5.83 275 0.073 0.168 222 0.187 0.099 27.36 26.50 6.05 253 0.075 0.169 0.034
5.83 275 0.073 0.196 216 0.212 0.100 27.15 26.38 6.04 255 0.075 0.197 0.030
5.83 275 0.073 0.224 208 0.246 0.101 26.97 26.30 6.03 256 0.075 0.225 0.026
Table 3: Comparative statics for the barrier model. The model’s ﬁt under dist1111 with the empirical target characteristics from table 3.2 is the reference point
(bold letters). Either characteristic changes ceteris paribus in steps of 1/5 of its standard deviation from three steps below the reference point up to three above.
Given a modiﬁed target set of characteristics, the model parameters are now ﬁtted again. The column "achieved characteristics" summarizes the corresponding
model characteristics after calibration. P denotes the model price, PSFAS is the price according to SFAS 123, given the model is true. Notation of characteristics:
b κ, the mean time of exercise; c Sκ, the mean stock price performance at exercise; b c, the mean cancellation rate; b ρ, the correlation of b κ and c Sκ. Notation of model
parameters: B, the value of the barrier at vesting time V ; α, the barrier’s growth rate; λ, the intensity of independent stopping.
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